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1 Introduction
How should the benefits and burdens of a society be divided up among its members?
This is a difficult question indeed but many people will agree that this division should
be based on impartiality. Stakes or vested interests should not play a role. How can
impartiality be achieved? In his “The Theory of Moral Sentiments” (1759, [1976])
Adam Smith developed the concept of an impartial spectator. On the first page of this
work, Smith wrote: “As we have no immediate experience of what other men feel, we
can form no idea of the manner in which they are affected, but by conceiving what we
ourselves should feel in the like situation”. A few lines below, Smith was a bit more
explicit: “By the imagination we place ourselves in his (i.e. our brother’s) situation, we
conceive ourselves enduring all the same torments, we enter as it were into his body, and
become in some measure the same person with him, and hence form some idea of his
sensations, and even feel something which, though weaker in degree, is not altogether
unlike them”. Smith argued that a spectator can only imagine from some distance
the sentiments that arise in the persons he is about to evaluate. In order to make his
judgments properly, the spectator should be well informed and take up an impartial
attitude.
Almost exactly two centuries later, Vickrey (1945) and Harsanyi (1953, 1955) came
up with the suggestion that vectors of income distribution or, more generally, social
states should be evaluated from the viewpoint of an impartial observer, who knows the
income values but is completely ignorant of his own position and the positions of the
other members of society. Again roughly twenty years later, Rawls (1971) put forward
a contractarian view. He suggested two principles of justice for the basic structure of
society that free and rational individuals would agree upon under a veil of ignorance
where no one knows his place in society nor his class position or social status, nor his
fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities.
In this paper, we wish to focus entirely on Harsanyi’s two models of utilitarian ethics
based on the Bayesian theory of rational behaviour and the concept of a cardinal von
Neumann–Morgenstern utility function. Some have argued that the two models are not
really distinct and that the distributional ethics from each of them are effectively iden-
tical. This paper takes issue with that position by focusing on the role of involvement
in the distributional judgment. It reports the result of a series of simple questionnaire
experiments that allows one to examine differences in distributional rankings accord-
ing to each of the two types of Harsanyi model. In a companion paper (Amiel et al.,
2006), we are looking at impersonal risk and risk with personal involvement outside the
utilitarian set–up. We only know of one other study that is somewhat related to our
own. Herne and Suojanen (2004) have looked at the role of the veil of ignorance within
Rawls’s set–up. Their experimental study investigates whether groups of individuals in
two simulated original positions, one with and the other without a veil of ignorance,
make different choices.
Section 2 provides the theoretical background for Harsanyi’s two models and sec-
tion 3 sets out the nature of the questionnaire experiment. Section 4 presents an
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overview of the results and section 5 offers an interpretation.
2 Harsanyi’s Two Models
The first of Harsanyi’s two models is commonly referred to as “Harsanyi’s aggregation
theorem” (Weymark 1991). It says that if the individual preferences and the social
preference relation satisfy the expected utility axioms and if Vi and V are the von
Neumann–Morgenstern utility representations of these individual relations and the so-
cial preference relation respectively, then, given that Pareto Indifference is satisfied,
there exist numbers ai, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and b such that for all elements p from a set of
lotteries L
V (p) =
n∑
i=1
aiVi(p) + b .
This means that the social utility of any p ∈ L must be a weighted linear combi-
nation of the individual utilities. The theorem does not say that the weights ai have
to be positive or at least nonnegative. Nor does it say that the vector of coefficients
(a1, . . . , an; b) is unique. Furthermore, this mathematical representation theorem does
not assume the possibility of interpersonal utility comparisons. Harsanyi (1978, p. 227)
says that if such comparisons are ruled out, then the coefficients ai will have to be
based completely on the evaluating person’s “personal – and more or less arbitrary –
value judgments”. The evaluator is not necessarily a member of the society that he is
examining. Harsanyi (1978, p. 226) mentions judges and other public officials who will
be “guided in their official capacities by some notions of public interest and of impar-
tial justice”. The evaluating person’s moral preferences have to satisfy certain Bayesian
rationality postulates so that “his moral value judgments will be such as if he tried to
maximize a special utility function expressing these moral preferences” (p. 226). This
utility function will be the evaluator’s social welfare function.
The mathematical representation theorem does not say that the vector of coeffi-
cients (a1, . . . , an) is positive. It can be rendered strictly positive by replacing Pareto
Indifference by Strong Pareto. The vector of coefficients (a1, . . . , an; b) becomes unique
by introducing a further requirement that Harsanyi did not make explicitly. This is
the axiom of Independent Prospects which says that for each individual one can find a
pair of prospects over which that person is not indifferent and over which every other
individual is indifferent.
The second model – often referred to as the “impartial observer theorem” – was
discussed by Harsanyi in a number of contributions (Harsanyi 1953, 1955, 1977, 1978).
The basic idea is already to be found in Vickrey (1945). This model presupposes the
possibility of interpersonal comparisons of utility. This is done in the way that an
impartial observer who is sympathetic to the interests of each member of society makes
moral value judgments for this society. More explicitly, the observer is to imagine
himself being person i, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, under social alternatives x, y, etc. In making
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this sympathetic identification with individual i, the observer not only considers himself
with i’s objective circumstances under x, y, . . ., but also is supposed to imagine himself
with i’s subjective characteristics, in particular with i’s preference ordering. This comes
close to the formulation that Smith was using to which we referred in the introduction.
In order to be impartial, the observer has to enter a thought experiment in which he is
imagining that he has an equal chance of being any person in society, complete with that
person’s objective and subjective circumstances. In this way, an equal consideration is
given to each person’s interests. In ranking the lotteries in L, the impartial observer,
person j – but it can be any j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, calculates the average expected utility of
each lottery so that for all p ∈ L, one obtains the formula of the arithmetic mean:
Vj(p) =
1
n
n∑
i=1
Vi(p).
The expression on the right hand side of this formula is person j’s expected utility.
In his purely verbal 1953 paper, Harsanyi explicitly relates evaluations in terms of
social welfare to the theory of choice involving risk. Specifically Harsanyi says that a
person’s value judgment on the distribution of income under complete ignorance of what
this person’s own relative position were within society would be a case of “impersonality
to the highest degree” and “a clear instance of a ‘choice involving risk’ ”(pp. 434-35).
Several authors have drawn attention to conceptual difficulties with Harsanyi’s two
models (see e.g. Weymark (1991) and Mongin (2001)). Some have even claimed that
the two models collapse into one. Harsanyi distinguished between them and took some
care to point out, as mentioned above, that the first model does not presuppose that
individual utilities be comparable across persons whereas the second model would be
meaningless without such a requirement. Also, the second model allows one to maxi-
mize the arithmetic mean of individual utilities whereas the first only proposes maxi-
mizing the sum. Without wishing to downplay the conceptual problems with Harsanyi’s
models it is legitimate to say that they represent an important strand within modern
utilitarianism.
The present paper is not intended to focus on conceptual issues within Harsanyi’s
utilitarian ethics. The purpose of this paper is to go into quite a different direction.
We saw above that a social situation, a certain distribution of incomes, let us say, may
either be evaluated by a “detached” person (e.g. a public official). Or it may be viewed
through the eyes of a person who knows that he or she is occupying one of the positions
in society but does not know which one, taking up an impartial and impersonal attitude
though, as we have outlined above. Our focus of interest is whether the two sets of social
situations are viewed as the same by the two types of observer. This point becomes
even more interesting in the light of that position which considers the two models as
basically being one model.
In what follows we set out, according to the structure of the two models, situations
where certain vectors of income are to be evaluated, income vectors that arise from
two different policies that we shall describe in the next section. We invite respondents
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to express their views on these income distribution vectors embedded in either the
context of the first or the second model. More concretely, we ask our respondents
to evaluate income distribution vectors under two policies A and B and state which
policy, according to their view, leads to a better situation for the persons involved. This
question has not been investigated in the present context where the perspective is on
the position of the observer. The discussion about the Harsanyi models often revolved
around the issues of linearity and interpersonal comparability. But here the question is
whether the evaluations would differ with the status of the observer.1
3 The situations to be evaluated
The situations presented to our respondents are based on Amiel and Cowell (1998,
1999) and were originally used in a larger investigation concerning inequality and risk
evaluations. For our current purposes, they were slightly rephrased in order to be as
close as possible to Harsanyi who considers welfare evaluations in terms of utilitarian
ethics.
The background for the questionnaires is a mythical country Alfaland that consists
of five different regions. These regions are identical with respect to all aspects except
for the incomes of their inhabitants. Within each region, there are no income differences
among the inhabitants. It is assumed that two economic policies A and B are under
consideration and that one of these is to be implemented next year. It is known that
the only effect of either policy will be on the income in each region. However, the effect
on the income in each region will depend on the economic situation then prevailing in
Alfaland: it is supposed that there are six different states in which Alfaland may find
itself in the coming year.
The Appendix shows the income distribution vectors under policies A and B for the
six different situations in which Alfaland may find itself. In each situation policies A
and B differ in the same way: a switch from policy A to policy B would represent a
simple notional income transfer from a richer to a poorer region.2 The notional transfer
affects different regions as one goes from situation 1 to situation 6.
There are two versions of our questionnaire experiments. In the first we ask respon-
dents to put themselves in the shoes of an outside observer who is asked to evaluate
policies A and B. In the second, they are asked to imagine that they themselves are
assigned to one of the regions of Alfaland, with equal probability of finding themselves
in one of the five regions.
In order to solve the evaluation problem, the two Harsanyi approaches would want
the outside observer (the public official) and the involved observer to get as much utility
information as possible from the different regions and then to maximize the respective
sum of utilities. Our respondents, mostly undergraduates, could not be expected do
1For a theoretical perspective on this issue, see, among others, Mongin (2001).
2It is a notional transfer because only one of the two policies is actually implemented: we do not
have policy A followed by policy B, for example.
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this: most had not yet attended a class in welfare economics when they participated in
the questionnaire experiment. In both versions they were asked to state which policy
would, in their own opinion, lead to a better situation, so they had to form their own
ideas of what “a better situation” for Alfaland would mean. Whether our respondents
were assuming strictly concave utility functions for each region or even an identical
utility function for all regions, we do not know.
In Harsanyi’s models a positive or negative net effect on overall utilitarian welfare
would depend on the properties of the individual utility functions. In his second model,
which is much simpler since there is a common weight of 1/n attached to the utility
functions of all n agents, a case of “relatively similar” strictly concave utility functions
for all persons in society would, “with high probability”, lead to the assertion that
under policy B, aggregate welfare is higher than under policy A.3
As noted earlier Harsanyi himself viewed his second model as a clear case of a
“choice involving risk” (1953, p. 435), with the consequence that “the cardinal utility
‘maximized’ in value judgments concerning social welfare and the cardinal utility max-
imized in choices involving risk may be regarded as being fundamentally based upon
the same principle” (p. 435). Harsanyi explained when a value judgment on the dis-
tribution of income would show impersonality to the highest degree. “This would be
the case if the evaluating person had exactly the same chance of obtaining the first
position (corresponding to the highest income) or the second or the third, etc., up to
the last position (corresponding to the lowest income) available within that scheme”
(p. 435). The phrasing in the second version of our questionnaire comes very close to
this formulation.
4 Results
The six different situations were presented to samples of student respondents in a se-
ries of experimental sessions during 2003.4 All were first–year or second–year students
of economics or business administration and came from the UK (LSE), Germany (Os-
nabru¨ck) and Israel (Ruppin). In each case the respondents completed the exercise dur-
ing class or lecture time and were randomly assigned an H1-type or H2-type question-
naire. Here H1 stands for the Harsanyi model with an outside observer, H2 represents
the model where the observer himself is a member of the society to be evaluated,with
probability 1/n for each of the possible positions.
We start with the overall figures comprising results from all three countries. In Ta-
ble 1 the six possible situations for Alfaland are labelled Q1 to Q6. For each individual
situation, we state the percentage of answers that find that policy B leads to a better
3This position is also consistent with approaches based on Dalton (1920).
4The empirical findings that are presented here form part of a broader investigation that looked at
a larger class of approaches to distributional analysis. For the questionnaire experiment reported in
Tables 1-4 the respondents were not offered monetary incentives to participate; but see the comments
on Table 6 below.
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percentage choosing policy B
N Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6
males
H1 76 63.2 81.6 72.4 61.8 85.5 61.8
H2 82 51.2 74.4 70.7 64.6 81.7 56.1
females
H1 62 54.8 79.0 72.6 59.7 74.2 51.6
H2 64 60.9 84.4 59.4 45.3 70.3 50.0
all
H1 141 58.9 80.9 72.3 61.0 80.9 56.0
H2 149 55.0 78.5 65.8 57.0 76.5 53.7
Table 1: Responses from all countries
situation in Alfaland than policy A, for all respondents and for males and for females
separately.5 Coming back to a point made in section 3, such an assertion would defi-
nitely hold under a utilitarian viewpoint if the individuals in all regions had the same
strictly concave utility function.
Although from previous studies there is evidence of rejection of the principle of
transfers in the context of both inequality and of social welfare (Amiel and Cowell
1999) it was not clear a priori what response should be expected when comparing the
two variants of the Harsanyi model. However, it is clear from the combined sample
(Table 1) that there is a well–defined pattern: the proportions of B–responses in the
outside–observer model vector dominate those in the model with involvement. The
pattern is slightly less clear–cut when broken down by males and females.6 However, it
is possible that there may be systematic differences between the groups of respondents
in each of the locations where we conducted the experiment. So we examine each of
the country subsamples.
For the UK subsample, there is again vector dominance of H1 responses over H2
(last two rows of Table 2). This vector dominance, which also holds for the female
students, does not hold for males.7 For Germany, the results are similar (Table 3).
5The male–female breakdown is reported here because previous studies have shown a significant
gender difference in responses to questionnaire–experiments – see for example Amiel and Cowell (2002).
In the present study the number of males and females do not sum to the number of total observation:
some respondents in the UK and Israel did not report their sex.
6A small–sample paired t test for differences shows that the proportion of B–responses is signifi-
cantly higher (at the 1% level) in H1 compared with H2. Considering males alone, there is a dominance
of H1 over H2 (significant at the 5% level) in five of the six questions; clearly question 4 is the excep-
tion. For the female subsample the proportion of B–responses is higher in H1 for only four out of six
questions, and the results are not significant.
7The paired t test for differences is highly significant for males and females combined (significance
level below 1%). For females alone H1 dominates at a 5% significance level. For males the proportion
of B–responses for H1 is greater than or equal to those for H1 in all but one case but the differences
are not significant.
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For the whole sample, there is vector dominance of H1 over H2 (at the 2% significance
level). This time, the male percentages show a vector dominance of H1 over H2 (also at
the 2% level); for the female responses, nothing like this happens. In three out of the six
questions, the H1 percentages are higher, in the other three questions, the opposite is
the case. This evidence suggests that there is clearly a greater propensity to conform to
standard norms of distributional rankings if the issue is posed in terms of the Harsanyi
outside–observer model rather than in terms of involvement.
percentage choosing policy B
N Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6
males
H1 24 62.5 79.2 70.8 66.7 79.2 62.5
H2 30 56.7 66.7 73.3 66.7 73.3 60.0
females
H1 18 72.2 88.9 83.3 83.3 83.3 72.2
H2 13 53.8 69.2 46.2 38.5 46.2 38.5
all
H1 43 65.1 83.7 76.7 74.4 81.4 65.1
H2 44 54.5 68.2 65.9 59.1 65.9 54.5
Table 2: Responses from UK subsample
percentage choosing policy B
N Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6
males
H1 31 74.2 80.6 80.6 64.5 93.5 74.2
H2 28 46.4 67.9 57.1 53.6 85.7 39.3
females
H1 17 47.1 70.6 70.6 58.8 76.5 35.3
H2 24 62.5 79.2 45.8 37.5 75.0 50.0
all
H1 48 64.6 77.1 77.1 62.5 87.5 60.4
H2 52 53.8 73.1 51.9 46.2 80.8 44.2
Table 3: Responses from Germany subsample
However, by contrast to the evidence of dominance of H1 over H2 for both the UK
and Germany subsamples, the results for the Israel subsample are striking. In the case
of Israel we again find significant differences in response patterns but in the opposite
direction – see Table 4. There is vector dominance with respect to H2 in all three cases,
i.e. the complete sample and the two breakdowns for males and females.8
8Significant at the 1% level for males and females combined, at the 5% level for males or females
taken separately.
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percentage choosing policy B
N Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6
males
H1 21 47.6 85.7 61.9 52.4 81.0 42.9
H2 24 50.0 91.7 83.3 75.0 87.5 70.8
females
H1 27 48.1 77.8 66.7 44.4 66.7 48.1
H2 27 63.0 96.3 77.8 55.6 77.8 55.6
all
H1 50 48.0 82.0 64.0 48.0 74.0 44.0
H2 53 56.6 92.5 79.2 66.0 81.1 62.3
Table 4: Responses from Israel subsample
We appear to have evidence of cultural differences in the responses to the outside–
observer model and the involvement model. We also have a nice example of how ag-
gregation can smooth out opposite answering behaviour: the (significant) results for
the combined sample mask the (strongly significant) opposite results for the Israel sub-
sample. But it leaves open the questions (a) whether it is some factor other than the
apparent country effect which is driving the differences in response patterns and (b)
whether the Israel results were idiosyncratic to that particular sample. To address these
questions we took two further steps.
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 All
sex -0.2726† -0.2402 -0.4317‡ -0.4545∗ -0.2230 -0.3436‡ -0.2279
age -0.0144 0.0099 0.0099 0.0475 0.0421 0.0537 0.0010
emp -0.0872 0.2447 -0.0671 -0.2072 0.1746 0.0646 0.0684
pol 0.0280 0.0673 -0.0211 -0.1076 0.0218 -0.0074 -0.0987
inc90 -0.0836 -0.0736 -0.0232 0.0682 0.0735 0.0860 0.0434
inc10 0.1351 0.1020 0.0123 0.0103 0.1737† 0.1554 0.1064
h1 0.1097 -0.1159 -0.0145 0.1458 0.1507 0.0399 0.3934‡
econ 0.1134 0.1294 0.0329 -0.1610 0.1534 -0.2823 -0.2262
deutd 0.1012 0.0382 -0.2867 -0.3427† 0.5162‡ -0.1162 -0.0428
israeld 0.1594 0.5531† 0.0634 -0.4741† 0.0920 -0.2854 -0.0506
const -0.0372 -0.0241 0.7077 -0.0648 -1.7472 -1.6214 -1.0621
N = 270; † significant at 10% level; ‡ significant at 5% level;
∗ significant at 1% level.
Table 5: Probit regression results
First we ran a simple probit regression to examine the role of personal characteristics
8
percentage choosing policy B
N Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6
males
H1 21 52.4 85.7 76.2 71.4 76.2 71.4
H2 26 57.7 80.8 80.8 88.5 69.2 69.2
females
H1 29 58.6 75.9 69.0 65.5 62.1 62.1
H2 21 61.9 90.5 71.4 61.9 90.5 61.9
all
H1 51 54.9 80.4 70.6 68.6 68.6 64.7
H2 50 62.0 86.0 78.0 76.0 78.0 66.0
Table 6: Responses from the second Israel sample
and other factors.9 The results in Table 5 show that whether the respondent is male or
female and the country dummy are crucial in determining whether or not the response
is “orthodox” in terms of the Harsanyi models. Almost without exception no other
personal characteristic is significant.
As a second step we re–ran the Israel questionnaire experiment in 2005 with a fresh
sample of respondents. On this occasion we used monetary incentives for participation.
The comparison of the results for this second sample, given in Table 6, with Table 4
is again remarkable. Once again Israeli respondents demonstrate that – by contrast to
those from the UK and Germany – there is a greater propensity to conform to standard
norms if the issue is posed in terms of involvement rather than in terms of the Harsanyi
9The model is
Pr (response pattern) = β0 + β1x1 + β2x2 + ...+ βkxk
where x1, ..., xk are k separate characteristics as follows:
• sex: male 0, female 1
• age: in years
• pol: political views (on 1,...,7 scale)
• inc90: income background (on 1,...,7 scale)
• inc10: income prospects (on 1,...,7 scale)
• h1: 1 if H1, 0 otherwise
• econ: 1 if special subject is economics
• deutd: 1 if Germany subsample
• israeld: 1 if Israel subsample
For further details on personal characteristics see the questionnaires in the appendix. The response
pattern in the columns of Table 5 are “B response in individual question i” (for i = 1, ..., 6) and “B
response in all questions 1,...,6 simultaneously”.
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outside–observer model.10
5 Discussion
A person who asserts that policy B leads to a better situation for Alfaland than policy
A must be convinced that an income transfer from a richer region to a poorer region
is welfare–increasing for the country. As we have noted, if the utility functions of all
persons who are representative of each of the five regions are identical and strictly
concave, the welfare–improving effect is unquestionable, independently of where the
transfer occurs. However, even if the utility functions for all representative persons in
each regions are strictly concave, the outcome is no longer so clear when the curvatures
of the utility functions vary. In a utilitarian calculus, marginal utility losses have to be
compared with marginal utility gains with the consequence that the net effect can be
of any sign.
Our results now show that, for the combined sample of respondents, a welfare–
improving effect of a transfer from rich to poor is more frequently acknowledged from
the position of an outside observer than from the point of view of an observer who
tries to be impartial but knows that he or she is involved. This statement is supported
by the overall results from Germany and the UK whereas the opposite is the case for
Israel.
The reasons for the difference between the UK and Germany on one side and Is-
rael on the other could lie in demographic factors such as the historical or political
background or some other experiences. The set of demographic questions (see the Ap-
pendix) that we had asked our respondents to answer does not seem to be able to
explain this difference. So there must be other factors, possibly subsumable under the
heading “cultural dimension”.
That respondents from the UK and Germany acknowledge a transfer from rich to
poor as welfare–increasing (“leading to a better situation in Alfaland”) more frequently
from the position of a detached observer than from the status of an impartial but
involved evaluator could mean the following. From an outside or detached point of
view where self–interest is not an issue and therefore, personal risks are not involved,
they find the argument that a transfer from rich to poor is welfare–increasing more
convincing than if they were personally affected, with a probability of 1/n though. It is
possible that whenever they feel directly involved, they would need more of a transfer
from rich to poor in order to regard such a policy as welfare–improving or “better”.
If this inference is correct, it may have something to do with their personal attitude
towards risk. By contrast, in a risky situation, Israeli respondents appreciate a transfer
from rich to poor more than they do from the position of an outside observer. Recall that
Harsanyi himself characterized the case of an impartial but involved observer as a clear
instance of a choice involving risk. For the Israeli respondents, it could be the case that
10The fact that we obtain the same pattern of results in the two Israel samples, with and without
payment for participation is consistent with Rubinstein’s (1999) observations.
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from an outside or somewhat detached position, their demands for a welfare–improving
transfer would have to be substantially higher. We say “substantially higher” because
of the clear vector dominance that we have found. It is possible that they interpreted
“better” as more egalitarian.
As we have seen, the two types of Harsanyi model – with or without involvement of
the observer – elicit sharply different response patterns. It is evident that there are clear
differences in these response patterns depending on the gender of the respondent and
on their country of origin. The possible impact of cultural background on the attitude
to fundamental distributional norms is an issue that deserves further exploration.
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A The questionnaires
On the following pages are the two questionnaires (H1 and H2) that were distributed
randomly within each group of respondents.
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INCOME DISTRIBUTION QUESTIONNAIRE
This questionnaire concerns people’s attitude to income distribution. We would be in-
terested in your view, based on hypothetical situations. Because it is about attitudes
there are no “right” answers. Some of the possible answers correspond to assumptions
consciously made by economists: but these assumptions may not be good ones. Your
responses will help to shed some light on this, and we would like to thank you for your
participation. The questionnaire is anonymous.
Alfaland consists of five regions that are identical in every respect other than the incomes
of their inhabitants. Everyone within a given region receives the same income, but
personal incomes differ from region to region.
Two economic policy proposals A and B are being considered for implementation in
Alfaland next year. It is known that – apart from their impact on personal incomes –
the two policies would have the same effect on the population. The impact upon the
regions’ incomes would depend upon the particular state of the Alfaland economy at
the time the policy (A or B) is to be introduced.
In each of questions (1) to (6) two alternative lists of incomes A and B (in Alfaland
local currency) are given. Each of these pairs represents the outcomes of the A–policy
and the B–policy on the five regions in each of six different situations in which Alfaland
might find itself next year. Imagine that you are invited to be an outside observer of
Alfaland. In each case please state which policy you consider would result in a better
situation in Alfaland by circling A or B. If you consider that the two policies will result
in an equivalent situation then circle both A and B.
1) A = (2, 5, 9, 20, 30) B = (2, 6, 8, 20, 30)
2) A = (2, 5, 9, 20, 30) B = (3, 5, 9, 20, 29)
3) A = (2, 5, 9, 20, 30) B = (2, 6, 9, 20, 29)
4) A = (2, 5, 9, 20, 30) B = (2, 10, 9, 15, 30)
5) A = (10 10, 10, 10, 30) B = (10, 10, 10, 20, 20)
6) A = (2, 5, 9, 20, 30) B = (2, 6, 9, 19, 30)
H1
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Finally, we would be grateful for some information about yourself:
• Are you male or female? M/F
Please circle your answer.
• What is your age? . . . years
• What is your special subject of study? . . . . . . . . . . . .
• Were you employed before university? Yes/No
Please circle your answer.
• How would you rate your political views? “extreme “extreme
Please put a × on this scale. left” right”
¤–¤–¤–¤–¤–¤–¤
• How would you rate your family’s income “very “very
10 years ago? Please put a × on this scale. poor” rich”
¤–¤–¤–¤–¤–¤–¤
• How would you rate your own income “very “very
prospects 10 years from now? poor” rich”
Please put a × on this scale. ¤–¤–¤–¤–¤–¤–¤
H1
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INCOME DISTRIBUTION QUESTIONNAIRE
This questionnaire concerns people’s attitude to income distribution. We would be in-
terested in your view, based on hypothetical situations. Because it is about attitudes
there are no “right” answers. Some of the possible answers correspond to assumptions
consciously made by economists: but these assumptions may not be good ones. Your
responses will help to shed some light on this, and we would like to thank you for your
participation. The questionnaire is anonymous.
Alfaland consists of five regions that are identical in every respect other than the incomes
of their inhabitants. Everyone within a given region receives the same income, but
personal incomes differ from region to region.
Two economic policy proposals A and B are being considered for implementation in
Alfaland next year. It is known that – apart from their impact on personal incomes –
the two policies would have the same effect on the population. The impact upon the
regions’ incomes would depend upon the particular state of the Alfaland economy at
the time the policy (A or B) is to be introduced.
In each of questions (1) to (6) two alternative lists of incomes A and B (in Alfaland
local currency) are given. Each of these pairs represents the outcomes of the A–policy
and the B–policy on the five regions in each of six different situations in which Alfaland
might find itself next year. Imagine that you have been assigned to one of the regions
in Alfaland with an equal chance of being in anyone of the five regions. In each case
please state which policy you consider would result in a better situation in Alfaland
by circling A or B. If you consider that the two policies will result in an equivalent
situation then circle both A and B.
1) A = (2, 5, 9, 20, 30) B = (2, 6, 8, 20, 30)
2) A = (2, 5, 9, 20, 30) B = (3, 5, 9, 20, 29)
3) A = (2, 5, 9, 20, 30) B = (2, 6, 9, 20, 29)
4) A = (2, 5, 9, 20, 30) B = (2, 10, 9, 15, 30)
5) A = (10 10, 10, 10, 30) B = (10, 10, 10, 20, 20)
6) A = (2, 5, 9, 20, 30) B = (2, 6, 9, 19, 30)
H2
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Finally, we would be grateful for some information about yourself:
• Are you male or female? M/F
Please circle your answer.
• What is your age? . . . years
• What is your special subject of study? . . . . . . . . . . . .
• Were you employed before university? Yes/No
Please circle your answer.
• How would you rate your political views? “extreme “extreme
Please put a × on this scale. left” right”
¤–¤–¤–¤–¤–¤–¤
• How would you rate your family’s income “very “very
10 years ago? Please put a × on this scale. poor” rich”
¤–¤–¤–¤–¤–¤–¤
• How would you rate your own income “very “very
prospects 10 years from now? poor” rich”
Please put a × on this scale. ¤–¤–¤–¤–¤–¤–¤
H2
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